Daryl Morey: The Theories of Basketball’s Bravest Thinker
What the many thoughts of basketball’s most recognized philosopher can teach about sports and life itself
DARYL MOREY IS known for many things across the sports world. There is his past organization‘s testing of the limits of three-point shooting, and his now publicly dismantled relationship with James Harden.
As he left his job after the Rockets’ elimination in the 2020 postseason, he even took a full-page ad claiming Harden “changed [his] life,” this coming after he claimed Harden was a better scorer than Michael Jordan.
There was also the time Morey tweeted “Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong” while the NBA was having preseason games in China. This momentarily created a huge rift in the league’s relationship with a country that was easily the sport’s biggest growing market.
The Morey-D’Antoni Rockets were bold and unapologetic for playing an extreme style of basketball, one that nearly took down the greatest dynasty in the modern NBA. In fact, since joining the Rockets, Morey’s influence has grown across the entire basketball landscape.
Current Rockets GM Rafael Stone, former Timberwolves President of Basketball Operations Gersson Rosas, former Sixers GM Sam Hinkie, Kings GM Monte McNair, and Bulls EVP/Basketball Operations Arturas Karnisovas are all disciples of Morey’s past front offices.
But to limit Morey’s strategies to just strategy or sports analytics would diminish his legacy. Basketball is the current space he’s in, but listening to his philosophies on any field, from soccer to movies, can inform about using frameworks to better analyze situations.
The Isolation of Variance, Risk, and Return
Basketball cannot be solved, and it will never be solved.
With the number of variables at play in any given scenario and the sport’s nuanced combination of art and science, there is a limit to how much data can inform teams.
Yet, what gets lost in Morey’s Rockets’ extreme strategies — switching 1–5 on defense, shooting more three-pointers than twos for three consecutive seasons, and eliminating traditional pick-and-rolls in favor of isolations — is that it exploited imbalances in the sport and maximized his team’s probability to win.
First, some context is needed. From 2015 to 2019, the Warriors were the frontrunner to win the title every season, and their combination of star power and ball movement made them virtually unbeatable. Barring one of the greatest shooting performances in NBA Finals history by the Cleveland Cavaliers in 2017, they would have been the first unbeaten team in NBA Playoff history.
With that in mind, the Rockets needed every advantage they could get, as no team could garner enough superstar power to match the Warriors.
Morey, Harden, and Mike D’Antoni were heavily criticized for the Rockets’ approach, one that favored matchup-hunting in isolation and three-point shooting over traditional pick-and-rolls and ball movement. Perhaps, the criticism is unwarranted.
While there are many variables in basketball, many are eliminated by isolations — this explains why many teams prefer isolation plays in close games, as it minimizes turnovers. The 2018 Rockets had two of the best isolation scorers (Harden and Chris Paul) in the league on a points-per-possession basis. Furthermore, with their strategy to matchup-hunt weaker defenders, not only could the Rockets control who was controlling their possession — they could select who was defending them.
An analogy Morey used to describe this phenomenon was having a prime Barry Bonds hit nine innings in a row while getting to choose who pitches against him. When the opposition was sporting what was then arguably the best offensive attack in NBA history, maximizing the returns of a more limited Rockets roster was their only chance of success.
On the other side of the court, given Golden State’s historic offensive efficiency, the Rockets’ only chance of stopping them, ironically, was forcing them to play isolation basketball. Less ball movement typically meant fewer high-quality attempts for Golden State’s shooters, and more mid-range attempts from Steph Curry, Klay Thompson, and Kevin Durant.
With regards to shot selection, a three-pointer is overvalued (a 50% increase in value) compared to other shots, especially when comparing the relative difficulty of shooting three-pointers compared to mid-range shots.
Therefore, the D’Antoni Rockets were banking on the variance of their three-point shooting, in combination with the expected return of their isolation possessions vs. Golden State’s, to be the reason they won.
In a simulation, the expected outcome from Houston’s 27 straight missed threes in Game 7 would lead to a Rockets win a substantial number of times. But science can’t account for human error, injuries, or even officiating, as numerous missed calls on three-point shots only added to the Rockets’ downward spiral.
Unfortunately for Morey’s Rockets, even after maximizing their championship probability given their roster and opponent, they never got over the hump. Sports history isn’t kind to those who finish second, but even Morey would likely concede that the Rockets’ flame-outs from 2018 to 2019 came down to factors out of their control.
One “Big Fish” Is Worth More Than the Rest of the Pond
It’s no secret that basketball history is defined by superstars, and that championship teams are built off these players.
Yet, only now has the sport started to reflect the true value of these “big fish” players. The era of player empowerment has coincided with more player mobility than ever before. The result? Teams have given up unprecedented numbers of draft picks, numerous swap rights on draft picks nearly a decade into the future and even given up young stars to acquire superstar-level talent.
From Anthony Davis to Kevin Durant, increasing numbers of superstars have requested trades in the past decade, and the construction of trades and the perception of player’s true values is changing by the season. Teams without picks are giving up swap rights on draft picks nearly a decade into the future, effectively giving other teams the option to short their future.
Yet, given the right level of talent, almost any level of investment is justifiable, a theory that Morey has stood firmly by since entering the league. While no one player’s impact can be completely isolated, it is no secret that players like LeBron James turned 30-win teams into 50–60-win teams almost instantly, or that players like Joel Embiid had striking per-minute impact metrics that were clear even on rebuilding Sixers teams.
Basketball is a team sport, but on a high level, having a superstar player brings a sustained competitive advantage over other teams that can almost turn the other marginal advantages (depth, strategy, experience) relatively meaningless when focusing on championship probability specifically.
If winning is the final goal of the sport, then the main indicators of what drives winning are all related to variables that drive point differential. Both data and common sense can explain that superstar players impact point differential at an incredible magnitude. Morey and other front office executives’s job is to optimize all aspects of their teams, but without the requisite talent, teams can be written off as non-contenders before seasons even begin.
Of course, there is still organizational risk involved with these transactions. While historical data might have illustrated a world where Rudy Gobert turned the Timberwolves into a contender with rim protection, rebounding, and vertical spacing, it is clear the trade was an overpay. There is a fine line between acquiring true superstars and overpaying for players who don’t move the needle enough, especially considering the extent of draft capital and swap options teams are moving in the trade market.
These ideas can inform why Morey took a risk on trading for Harden as an undervalued asset in 2012 and why he held out against trading Ben Simmons until the trade deadline in 2021–2022, firmly believing that he needed an All-Star level player to complement Joel Embiid.
Going forward, with Harden now publicly requesting a trade out of Philadelphia, this theory can likely be applied again. It’s entirely possible Morey values Harden’s max contract slot, which opens after this season, as being more valuable than any players he can bring back in a trade. In fact, the Sixers already passed on Tyrese Maxey’s impending extension to preserve cap space for this offseason. With Embiid in his prime, it seems Morey will maximize his chance at getting players that strongly boost his team’s championship potential, even if it means keeping a disgruntled Harden on the roster.
Above All, Maximize the System
While Morey is most known for the Rockets’ extreme strategies, he’s been clear on his strategic priority: maximizing his team’s championship odds given their system. He has been a proponent of the 5% rule: any team with a 5% championship probability should push its resources to go for it.
In 2006, Morey traded the #8 pick (Rudy Gay) for Shane Battier, a proven veteran. In doing so, he helped unlock Yao Ming, his 7'6" center, as Battier was one of the best post-entry passers in the NBA, and Yao was virtually unstoppable near the basket because of his height, shooting touch, and ability to make free throws if fouled.
There is absolutely a risk in trading #8 picks — teams today rarely trade lottery picks unless they are swapping lottery picks, or trading for a star. Yet, in this case, maximizing the system meant finding a way to help Yao Ming, and the Yao-era Rockets’ most impressive playoff run came in a season where an injury to Tracy McGrady left them without their other star.
Nearly two decades later, the 2022 Sixers half-court offense was almost entirely built on two plays: Joel Embiid post-ups and James Harden pick-and-rolls. In general, they also slowed the pace in the half-court but still had players like Tyrese Maxey who are efficient in transition.
The result was a team that shot 55.1% on two-point field goals, 38.7% on threes, and 83.5% on free throws — they had elite efficiency across the board. They also had the previous Eastern Conference Champion, the Boston Celtics, on the brink of elimination in Game 6.
In a similar spirit to the Battier trade, Morey traded a first-round pick for De’Anthony Melton and signed P.J. Tucker, two players who could fit into the Sixers’ offensive scheme while increasing their versatility on defense.
Yet, just like the D’Antoni Rockets, the Sixers flamed out in the postseason, unable to make it past Game 7 of the second round again. Arguably, the Sixers got closer than ever to winning a championship since “The Process” began. Yet, whether it be Embiid’s lingering injury, Harden seeming to wear down due to fatigue, or simply players missing shots that statistical models deem valuable, the team is in the same place as before.
Basketball teams are covered in very absolute terms: teams that are contenders are either “successful” in winning the championship, or failures. But from the perspective of coaches and executives, the sport is a very probabilistic model: they can only try to maximize their probability of winning, with no guarantee of results.
Think about the Rockets’ highly-publicized trade to go all-in on small-ball with Russell Westbrook. Was the trade of Clint Capela to get Robert Covington likely to get Houston a championship? No, but having another non-shooter next to Westbrook gave Houston almost no chance to win. Once Morey was forced to trade Paul for Westbrook, with little draft capital and a veteran-laden roster, he had to maximize his roster’s chance of winning by doing the extreme.
It would be interesting to see what Morey’s philosophies in other systems would be in a field that is less categorical about winning and losing. In fact, Sam Hinkie, another Morey disciple, is now working in venture capital, a field with a far different discourse than the “Process.”
Ultimately, will basketball history remember Morey as a winner? That remains to be seen, but Morey’s contributions to the way organizations think about the sport should be remembered for many years to come.
All stats via Basketball Reference
